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THE DEBATE OVER THE UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OF PRIVATE
PHYSICIANS
I. INTRODUCTION
For years many workers in the United States have had the ability to
unionize to improve their working conditions. As the industries and the
work forces change so will the types of workers wanting to unionize.
Doctors are one of those groups that are struggling to change the law to
give them the ability to unionize and collectively bargain.
This Note will highlight the current controversy over physician
unionization. The problems and issues raised will establish that for
physician unionization to be effective, new legislation must be
implemented.
Part II begins with a discussion of the background information
surrounding the complex facets of the medical profession. The first
section explains how groups of doctors can be distinguished from one
another and placed into one of three broad categories. Placement in these
categories is a reflection of each group's need for union assistance. The
next section explains how health plans are similarly distinguishable, and
are usually categorized by the method of payment for the health services
provided. The final section of Part II discusses existing doctors' unions
and examines the different reasons physicians are interested in
unionizing.
Many obstacles in the current law hinder or prevent private
physicians from joining unions. Some issues arise from antitrust
regulations,' while others are due to the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or "Act"). 2 Part III explains and discusses how these legal
issues create potential problems for physician unionization. This Note
focuses specifically on whether private doctors can and should be
covered under the NLRA. The main question lies in whether physicians

1. Congress has passed two different acts addressing antitrust. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1994); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1994).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1994).
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are considered to be employees, independent contractors, or supervisors,
and how
this determination can affect physician coverage under the
3
NLRA.
Recently, Congress proposed legislation that would remove several
of the obstacles discussed in Part IH. 4 This legislation attempts to
eliminate certain problems by creating an exception for doctors under
the NLRA. Part IV discusses this proposed legislation and how its
implementation may or may not remove these obstacles.
This Note will show that the current state of physician unionization
is in disarray. However, it will be equally apparent that legislation may
not resolve this problem and other solutions should be implemented.
II. BACKGROUND ON PHYSICIAN UNIONIZATION
A. Categorizationof Doctors
When determining if a doctor can unionize, one must first look at
the nature of the doctor's employment. As a practitioner, a doctor fits
into one of three categories. 6 He or she is either: on staff; a resident,
intern, or fellow; or in private practice.7 Presently, a doctor's ability to
join a union and collectively bargain primarily depends on which
category he or she is in."
Staff doctors make up the first category of practitioners. Unlike
doctors in private practice, they are employees of and receive a set salary
from the hospital or clinic that employs them. 9 These doctors are not
considered to be self-employed because their salaries are paid by the

3. See id. at §§ 151-52, 157.
4. See H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (1999). Currently H.R. 1304 has been put on hold to be dealt
with in the future. See Karen Foerstel, GOP Leaders OrderHyde to Kill Bill on Doctor Bargaining,
at http:llthomas.loc.govlcgi-binlquerylD?r106:32:Jtempl-rlO6tXQOt:e25821:
(Nov. 1, 1999) (on
file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal). This bill is one of the more complicated
bills that has been introduced. See id. Other health care bills that were proposed in 1999 include
H.R. 2723 and H.R. 2824. See H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted) (providing a patients' bill
of rights); H.R. 2824, 106th Cong. (1999).
5. See H.R. 1304.
6. See Robert L. Lowes, Strength in Numbers: Could Doctor Unions Really Be the Ans'er?,
MED. ECON., June 29, 1998, at 115; Steven Greenhouse, Unions Find Fertile Ground Recruiting
Country'sDoctors, OREGONIAN (Portland), Feb. 7, 1999, at A16, available at 1999 WL 5316354
[hereinafter Greenhouse, Unions].
7. See Lowes, supra note 6, at 115; Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16.
8. See infra Part Il.C (discussing protection under the NLRA).
9. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16; Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 261
N.L.R.B. 569,571 & n.12 (1982).
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hospital.'0 They want to unionize and collectively bargain to improve
patient care" and negotiate their contracts with hospitals regarding

wages and working conditions. 2 Presently, doctor unionization has
13
since no problems arise
occurred most frequently among staff doctors
4
NLRA.1
the
under
regarding their coverage
The second category of doctors includes interns, residents, and
fellows. These are doctors who have graduated from medical school, but
are not yet Board certified. Interns are doctors just out of medical
school 6 in post-graduate work who experience their first year of
supervised practical training (hands-on experience) by rotating through
various basic areas of medicine.'7 Residents study under a medical
specialist"3 to gain greater knowledge and skill in a particular area of
medicine." They treat patients under the guidance of these more
experienced physicians. 20 Fellows are doctors that have already
completed both an internship and a residency.2 A fellowship generally

10. See Lowes, supra note 6, at 115.
11. See id.
12. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16.
13. See id.
14. See infra Part llI.C.
15. "Board certified" refers to a physician who passed a specific examination and is now
certified as a specialist in that area of expertise. See VERGIL N. SLEE, MD ET AL., HEALTH CARE
TERMS 75 (3d ed. 1996). The Boards are a national examination given to doctors by the National
Board of Medical Examiners. See id. The first part of this exam is taken after the second year of
medical school. See RACHEL EPSTEIN, CAREERS IN HEALTH CARE 28 (Dale C. Garell, M.D. et al.
eds., 1989). Usually, passing all parts of this exam results in a license to practice medicine. See
SLEE Er AL., supra, at 75-76. Some states require additional examinations for a doctor to become
licensed. See id. at 76; see also Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (Nov. 26, 1999), 1999
WL 1076118, at *3 (NLRB).
16. See SLEE Er AL., supra note 15, at 463. Interns are also called first-year resident
physicians. See id.
17. See id.; THOMAS C. TIMMRECK, PH.D., HEALTH SERVICES CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY: A
COMPENDIUM OF HEALTH-CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH TERMINOLOGY 721 (3d ed., Jones & Bartlett
Pubs., Inc. 1997) (1982); Boston Med. Ctr., 1999 WL 1076118, at *3.
18. A medical specialist is a physician who practices a particular area of medicine or surgery.
See TIMMRECK, supranote 17, at 355, 357; SLEE ET AL., supra note 15, at 558. This is different than
a primary care physician who, like your family doctor, conducts the initial check-up and then refers
the patient to a specialist if a specific problem arises. See SLEE ET AL., supranote 15, at 463.
19. After completion of medical school and their internship, these doctors-in-training must
choose an area of medicine they would like to specialize in or concentrate on. See TIMMRECK, supra
note 17, at 650. These specialties range from non-surgical areas such as internal medicine, family
medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics, and gynecology to surgical specialties such as orthopedics, thoracic,
neurological, and plastic surgery. See EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 32-43. The length of the residency
program depends upon the complexity of the specialty area chosen and ranges from 3-5 years. See
id. at 32, 40, 43.
20. See EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 27; TIMMRECK, supra note 17, at 650.
21. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251,251 (1976).
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lasts for one year during which time the fellow studies a particular part
of the body in the field he or she has chosen. 2 Similar to staff doctors,
interns, residents, and fellows are paid by the teaching hospitals that
employ them. 23
For the purposes of unionizing, interns, residents, and fellows are
distinguished from licensed physicians. They are referred to as house
staff and, as a bargaining unit, have unique concerns. 24 Their main
concern is to improve working conditions.2' While licensed physicians
are also concerned with improving working conditions, as discussed
below, their concerns are different than those of the house staff.26 This
difference raises the issue of unit determination because if licensed
physicians want to bargain, it is unlikely that they will be in the same
category as interns, residents, and fellows. The reason for this is that

when the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board")
determines a bargaining unit, it wants that bargaining unit comprised of
employees with enough in common so that one person could bargain
without having to make a lot of trade-offs. 7 This would not be true of a
bargaining unit made up of both licensed physicians and house staff
because the two groups lack commonality.
When making a unit determination, the Board looks to four factors:

1) whether the employees have similar economic interests (i.e., salary
range, hours, benefits, job functions, qualifications, skills); 2) the history
of collective bargaining in that field; 3) the extent of employee
organization; and 4) if everything else comes out even, the Board will
22. See id.; EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 43. Sixty percent of residents studying the area of
orthopedic surgery continue on after completing their five-year residency program to study a
subspecialty for another year in a fellowship program. See EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 43.
Orthopedic subspecialties include concentration on the spine, shoulder, hip, foot, or ankle. See id.
23. See Cedars-Sinai,223 N.L.R.B. at 252; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 27. Cf. Boston
Med. Ctr., 1999 WL 1076118, at *3 (noting that interns, residents, and fellows who attend Boston
University School of Medicine are paid by both the School of Medicine and Boston Medical Center
and receive health, dental, life and malpractice insurance as well as paid vacation and sick leave).
24. See Boston Med. Ctr., 1999 WL 1076118, at *3; Lowes, supra note 6, at 115. For
example, a resident's interests may lie in negotiating the number of hours per week of training while
a licensed physician may be more concerned with negotiating over higher quality care for patients.
25. See Lowes, supra note 6, at 115. As a part of their training process, residents have a call
schedule. See EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 27. If a resident is "on call" Monday night, he would have
to work his normal training hours Monday, be "on call" Monday night and still be responsible for
his normal training hours on Tuesday, regardless of how much sleep, if any, he got Monday night.
See id.
26. See THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE Er AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
265-66 (10th ed. 1999).
27. See id. (stating that the representative of a collective bargaining unit shall be the sole
representative in that unit in bargaining for "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment").
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look to the desire of the employees.2 When looking at these factors, it is
apparent that house staff and licensed physicians do not fit into the same
bargaining unit. They do not share the same economic interests,
organization history, or desires. 29 It is extremely important for the
bargaining unit determination to be proper because an employer who
feels that the Board erred in making a unit determination can refuse to
bargain with the representatives of that unit.30
Until recently, interns, residents, and fellows have been denied
coverage under the NLRA.3" In November 1999, the NLRB overruled
prior decisions and for the first time held that interns, residents, and
fellows are employees under Section 2(3) of the NLRA and entitled to
the rights afforded under the Act.32 Due to this change in the law, this
Note will not discuss the need for interns, residents, and fellows to
unionize.33

The third category of practitioners is physicians in private practice.
Some private physicians affiliate with hospitals in order to perform
certain procedures, but their offices are independent and the hospital

28.

See MICHAEL C. HARPER & SAMUEL ESTREICHER, LABOR LAw 327 (4th ed. 1996).

Sometimes there are restrictions on unit determinations other than the four commonality factors.
These restrictions can be found in Section 9(b) of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994). It
provides that:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit... Provided, [t]hat the
Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit
includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional
employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such
unit; or (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground
that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a
majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation
or (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with
other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce against employees and
other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons
on the employer's premises ....

Id. (emphasis in original).
29.

See generally JAN SUGAR-WEBB, OPPORTUNITIES IN PHYSICIAN CAREERS 33, 48,50, 61-

62, 65-66, 68-69, 76, 81 (2000) (contrasting residents' salaries with those of licensed physicians).
30. See ST. ANTOINE ET AL., supra note 26, at 301-02 (noting that an employer's refusal to
bargain with a union in this situation is a legitimate action).
31. See Cedars-Sinai,223 N.L.R.B. at 253. In Cedars-Sinai,the Board concluded that house
staffs (interns, residents, and fellows) primary purpose for holding these positions was to gain the
requisite education and training needed to become licensed doctors. See id. Therefore, interns,
residents, and fellows were deemed students and not employees covered by Section 2(3) of the
NLRA and not entitled to bargaining rights. See id.
32. See Boston Med. Ctr., 1999 WL 1076118, at *16, 19-20.
33. See id.
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does not pay the doctors for their services.' 4 Rather, their salaries consist
of patient payments and health plan provider reimbursements.35 Many of
these doctors also have ownership interests in their practices. "6
Therefore, private practitioners are considered to be self-employed.
It is important to determine which category a doctor fits into when
analyzing his or her right to unionize and collectively bargain." This

Note focuses on physicians in private practice because it is unclear as to
whether they, unlike staff doctors and house staff, have any protection
under the NLRA.
B. The Different Types of Health Plan Providers
To better understand why private physicians want to unionize, it is
important to learn more about the "other side"-the insurance providers.
When paying for medical expenses, an individual may use health

insurance. Generally, a person has three options: service plans,
indemnity plans, or managed care organization plans.3" Within each of
these plans, people can specifically tailor their coverage to meet their
individual medical needs.
With a service plan, payments for medical care are made directly to
the doctor and/or hospital by the insurance organization.39 The
beneficiary of'a service plan receives services rather than cash.40 Patients
usually have to pay a certain portion of their medical bills before the
health insurance service contributes.4
Under indemnity plans, medical coverage is provided by insurance
34. See generally ALAN G. RAYMOND, THE HMO HEALTH CARE COMPANION: A
CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE NETWORKS 1-15 (1994) (addressing the issue of doctor
reimbursement).
35. See generally id. (highlighting the differences between HMOs and traditional insurance
providers).
36. See Who Can Join Bargaining Unit, AM. ACAD. FOR ORTHOPEDIC SURGEONS BULL,
Aug. 1999, at 15.
37. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-52, 157. Under the NLRA, only employees have the right to
unionize and collectively bargain. See id.
38. See generally AmeriHealth Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Oct. 18, 1999), 1999 WL 963200,
at *4 (discussing the three types of health insurance options); THE NATIONAL DIRECTORY OP
MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS I-1I (Gwendolyn B. Lareau & Phyllis J. Harris eds., 2d ed. 1998)
[hereinafter NATIONAL DIRECTORY] (containing a detailed profile of over 1,800 managed care
organizations throughout the United States).
39. See HEALTH CARE CHOICES: FOR TODAY'S CONSUMER 31, 39 (Marc S. Miller cd. 1995).
40. See SLEE Er AL., supra note 15, at 67.
41. See HEALTH CARE CHOICES, supra note 39, at 32. Blue Cross and Blue Shield is an
example of an organization providing this type of coverage. See SLEE ET AL., supra note 15, at 67,
72-74.
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companies. 42 The insurance company pays a fixed amount for medical
care, and if the cost exceeds this amount, the patient is responsible for
the difference. 43 Insurance companies interact with the physicians only to
discuss payment information." The difference between service and
indemnity plans lies with the type of benefits provided.45 Contrary to
service plans, the benefits under indemnity plans are cash payments. 6
These cash payments are sent either to the beneficiary for reimbursement
or directly to the health care provider. 47
The last plan offered is that of the managed care organization
("MCO"). 4 s Various organizations such as health maintenance
organizations ("HMOs"), 49 preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"),50
42. See AmeriHealth Inc., 1999 WL 963200, at *4.
43. See AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, CHOOSING AND USING A
HEALTH PLAN: WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF HEALTH PLANS THAT
available at
2001)
22,
Apr.
visited
(last
TODAY
AVAILABLE
ARE
http://my.webmd.comcontent/article/1680.51357 (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment
Law Journal).
44. See AmeriHealth Inc., 1999 WL 963200, at *4.
45. See SLEE ET AL., supranote 15, at 67.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See SLEE E AL., supra note 15, at 266. Managed health care arose due to the increasing
costs of indemnity insurance after the 1960s. See id. at 353-55; see also AmeriHealth Inc., 1999 WL
963200, at *4.
49. See AmeriHealthInc., 1999 WL 963200, at *4; NATIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 38, at
I. HMOs have several different models which are characterized, for the most part, by the type of
physicians they contract with. See RAYMOND, supra note 34, at 6. There are several common
models for HMOs. See id. at 6-13. The first is staff model HMOs. See id. at 7. Staff model HMOs
own the health centers and employ the doctors that work there. See id. The second type is group
model HMOs. See id. at 8. In this model, one or more physician practices contract with the HMO
and provide medical services for each patient who is a member of that HMO. See id. at 8-9. This
type of HMO does not employ the physicians. See id. at 9. The third type of HMO, the independent
practice association ("IPA"), is the fastest growing form of IIO in the United States. See id. IPAs
are formed by many individual private practice physicians who are combined to form a network of
doctors for the HMO member to choose from. See id. The HMO pays IPA doctors a fixed amount
per patient. See id. at 9-10. IPAs are preferred because they have a large selection of doctors to
choose from. See id. at 10. A downside to IPAs is the hassle of finding a local specialist included in
the plan. See id. The fourth type of IM4O is the point of service HMO ("POS"). See id. at 11-12. A
member of a POS receives health care from physicians and hospitals within the HIO network or
outside of it, all the while receiving coverage. See id. at 12. If members choose a network doctor,
the only payments they are responsible for is the small co-pay paid at the time of each visit. See id.
But if a member chooses a non-network physician, that member "ha[s] to share the costs in much
the same way as with traditional health insurance coverage." Id. The fifth type of iMO is the
Network or Mixed Model HMO. See id. at 11. This HMO takes several different HMOs and
combines them to form an individualistic HMO for a particular patient's needs. See id.
50. See AnieriHealthInc., 1999 WL 963200, at *4; NATIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 38, at
11.PPOs are organizations that combine doctors and hospitals in order to provide lower cost health
care. See RAYMiOND, supra note 34, at 13-14. There is no formal organization of PPOs, in fact
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exclusive provider organizations ("EPOs"),5" and integrated delivery

systems ("IDS") or physician hospital organizations ("PHOs") offer this

type of medical plan.12 MCO plans differ from service and indemnity
plans in two ways, payment options and control. Regarding payment,

MCOs have two methods of compensating physicians, capitation and fee

for service. 3 Capitation is "the fixed amount per patient per month
regardless of the number of services or procedures provided to the
patient."" Conversely, under the fee for service option, the MCO pays a
certain amount of money for each procedure or visit the member has.55
The other difference between MCOs and other health plan
providers is the amount of control the organization has. MCOs exert
varying levels of control over doctors and their patients, the main goal
being efficiency.56 They maintain control by providing a select list of

doctors from which their members may choose.57 The MCOs can also

limit which medical procedures a doctor can perform on a patient and
when and where the procedures can be done." MCO managers do this by
assessing the member's medical situation and deciding whether the
doctor may perform the procedure. 9 Comparatively, insurance
companies leave all medical decisions to the doctor's discretion and only
"[t]here is little uniformity among the organization of various PPOs." SLEE ET AL., supra note 15, at
479. "[A] leading PPO consultant, testified at a 1985 Congressional hearing, 'if you've seen one
PPO, you've seen one PPO.' Id. PPOs were actually designed to compete with HMOs. See id.
PPOs can be differentiated from HMOs. First, PPOs do not absorb the cost of physician decisions
regarding medical procedures while, on the other hand, HMOs do. See id. This largely has to do
with the fact that PPO physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis while HMOs will pay their
choice physicians an annual salary for each HMO patient. See id. Also, a PPO member is not
committed to using the health care providers chosen by the PPO. See id.
51. EPOs are similar to PPOs. They are "made up of a group of physicians, one or more
hospitals, and other providers who contract with an insurer, employer, or other sponsoring group to
provide discounted medical services to enrollees." RAYMOND, supra note 34, at 14. These enrollees
can receive health care services from another doctor without authorization from their primary care
doctor so long as that doctor also participates in the EPO network. See id.
52. In the IDS and PHO plans, hospitals, primary care physicians, and specialists bind
together and contract with other managed care organizations to provide a combination managed care
plan. See id. at 15.
53. See AmeiHealth Inc., 1999 WL 963200, at *4.
54. Id.; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 20. Because physicians are paid an annual salary
per HMO patient, some people are concerned that doctors are encouraged to keep a patient's
medical costs to a minimum. See RAYMOND, supra note 34, at 3. People fear that the medical care
provided will be of a lesser quality since a doctor may skip a test or procedure in order to keep the
cost down. See id.
55. See AmeriHealth Inc., 1999 WL 963200, at *4.
56. See id.
57. See id. at *5.
58. See id. at *4.
59. See id.
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interact with physicians on issues of payment:
C. The CurrentState of Physician Unionization
Although there are many obstacles to physician unionization, as of

1999, approximately 45,000 doctors in the United States were
unionized.6 ' However, this only amounted to six percent of the doctors in
this country.6 2 Until recently, doctors' unions were limited to doctors
employed directly by hospitals and clinics.63 This is no longer true.
Private physicians are now joining traditionally blue-collar unions to
gain leverage to negotiate with HMOs.6' Among these unions are the
United Food and Commercial Workers ("UFCW"),65 the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers ("IAMAW"), 6 and
the American Federation of Teachers.6 7

To adapt to the changing times, the American Medical Association
("AMA") joined in the unionizing efforts.' Its decision to support
physician unionization came about in 1997 when the AMA changed its
stance concerning doctors' unions.69 Some observers say that the AMA's
involvement reflects the urgency of the situation because while it has
always been opposed to labor unions, it has overriding complaints
regarding HMOs.7 The AMA, however, is not forming a typical union,

rather, it is trying to offer "an alternative to traditional labor unions."7'
60. See Ameri-ealth Inc., 1999 WL 963200, at *4.
61. See Chris Phan, Physician Unionization: The Impact on the Medical Profession, 20 J.
LEGAL MED. 115, 115 (1999) (discussing how there are doctors unions in place and that there has
been a substantial "surge" recently); Rafael Gerena-Morales, 2 Labor Groups to Form National
Doctor's Union, NE\vSDAY (Nassau), March 2, 1999, at A41.
62. See Gerena-Morales, supra note 61, at A41. An example of a current doctors' union is the
Doctors Council which is a union representing 3,400 doctors, most of them being attending
physicians in hospitals (staff doctors) in the New York City area. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra
note 6, at A16. This union has joined forces with the Service Employees International Union to
form the National Doctors Alliance which will attempt to organize the 750,000 doctors in the
United States. See Gerena-Morales, supranote 61, at A41.
63. See Melanie Burney, NLRB Rejects N.J. Doctors' Union, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24,
1999, available at 1999 WL 17806934.
64. See Lowes, supra note 6, at 115; Greenhouse, Unions, supranote 6, at A16.
65. See Lowes, supra note 6, at 115.
66. See id. at 118.
67. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16.
68. See Tammy Webber, Doctors' Union PromisesNo Strikes, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETT,
Oct. 12, 1999, at FS, available at 1999 WL 25694161.
69. See Phan, supra note 61, at 136. The AMA's change of heart was apparent when it
endorsed attempted physician unionization in Rockford, Illinois. See id. at 137.
70. See id. at 136; Burney, supranote 63.
71. Bruce Japsen, AMA Tells Docs: Organize Unions on As-needed Basis, KNIGHT-RIDDER

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

9

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 11
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Jounial

[Vol. 18:659

As the AMA promises, this new union, Physicians for Responsible
Negotiations ("PRN"), will be different from traditional unions.:
The biggest difference stems from the fear of the negative
repercussions that always seem to follow failed negotiations. 7" This fear
resulted in the AMA assuring that doctors in PRN will never strike. 74
Todd Vande Hey, AMA Vice President of Private Sector Advocacy and
a member of the union's governing body, says striking is not an option
and is "unacceptable" to the AMA.75 Moreover, the PRN will not recruit
doctors76 nor will it petition the NLRB for recognition, leaving that
decision to the doctors themselves.77
The AMA's involvement has insurance companies concerned.78
Currently, under federal antitrust laws, no self-employed doctors can
collectively bargain. 79 The AMA is working to have doctors exempted
from antitrust law, allowing private doctors to unionize and collectively
bargain." The fear of private doctors collectively coming to the
bargaining table has some health plan providers attempting to improve
relations with doctors."s One way they are doing this is by including
doctors on committees, giving them a voice in decision making. n For
example, one insurance company, Aetna Inc., currently hired a "former
AMA official to repair its relations with doctors."83 These changes are
only the beginning; more are anticipated and once more private doctors
become involved, the law surrounding physician unionization is more
likely to change.
D. PrivateDoctors and Why They Want to Unionize
Doctors, as well as patients, have long been complaining about
TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Sept. 10, 1999, at 1.

72. See id. The name for the union was "chosen with great care." Webber, supra note 68, at
FS.
73. See Donald Kaul, Editorial, Docs in Unions? 'Educational' TV? What Next?, ST. J.-REG.,
July 1, 1999, at 5 (giving an illustration of a patient on the operating table as the surgeon yells
"strike").
74. See id.
75. Webber, supranote 68, at F8.
76. See id.
77. See Japsen,supra note 71.
78. See Webber, supra note 68, at F8.
79. See id.
80. See id. This would leave MCOs with no option but to negotiate with over half a million
doctors. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Webber, supra note 68, at F8.
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MCOs8 4 In the past decade, the power and number of MCOs have grown
substantially, and with them, complaints about the health care system in
this country." Private doctors were able to make independent decisions,
but now that MCOs are larger and stronger, most independent doctors
are forced to follow the rules and guidelines established by the managed
care companies. 6 This often leads to a decline in the quality of service to
patients.7 Some physicians are so outraged by what is happening that
they claim "HiMOs are trading patient lives and limbs for profits.""8 This
frustration is just one reason compelling many doctors to join, or at least
consider joining, a union because they feel it will help them maintain
control over the medical decisions involving their patients. 9
A second reason why doctors choose to unionize is to improve their
working conditions. Doctors want a safe and clean environment in which
to work, with the necessary staff and equipment, and are unhappy with
84. See supra Part lI.B (discussing the different types of MCOs and how those differences
affect doctors and patients).
85. See Patricia Mullen Ochmann, Managed Care OrganizationsManage to Escape Liability:
Why Issues of Quantity vs. Quality Lead to ERISA's Inequitable Preemption of Claims, 34 AKRON
L. REV. 571,574 (2001).
[M]ore than 125 million Americans rely on more than 2.5 million group health plans for
medical coverage. With more than 70 percent of the American workforce and their
families enrolled in MCOs, issues concerning patients' rights and the quality of care
received under managed care plans affect the majority of the U.S. population.
Id. See also Jeremy Lutsky, Is Your Physician Becoming a Teamster: The Rising Trend of
PhysiciansJoining Labor Unions in the Late 19 90s, 2 DE PAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 55, 55 (1997).
86. See Phan, supra note 61, at 117; Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16 (noting that
more than ninety percent of doctors in the United States have at least one contract with an MCO). If
the patient is covered by an HMO, the doctor may feel pressure when making medical decisions
about that patient. This pressure comes from the fact that if a patient receives many diagnostic tests,
procedures, or hospitalization the HMO will have to absorb these expenses since it pays a flat rate to
the doctor each year for his or her services. See EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 20. On the other hand, if
the patient's medical fees are lower than the annual fee paid by the HIO for the medical services,
the doctor may receive an end of the year bonus. See id. Since the doctor and the HMO have a
contractual relationship, the amount of money the doctor saves or costs the HIMO may have bearing
on whether or not the HMO renews the contract with the particular doctor for the next term. This
can be very important to a doctor with a majority of his patients covered by part of the HMO
network.
87. See Burney, supra note 63.
88. Id. HMOs require the physicians to pack-in patients, thereby limiting the time that can be
spent with each one. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16. A doctor in California said his
HMO expected him to see eight patients per hour, which would limit his time with each patient to
seven and a half minutes. See Steven Greenhouse, Look for the Union Scalpel, P1TTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Feb. 7, 1999, at A3.
89. See Phan, supra note 61, at 115-17. Often what happens is that if the HMO feels the
doctor "order[ed] too many tests," "use[d] too many resources," or kept an HMO patient at the
hospital for longer than what is considered appropriate, the doctor will be questioned extensively
about the reasons for taking these costly actions. EPSTEIN, supranote 15, at 22. Many doctors resent
being questioned about their medical instincts. See id.
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the hours expected of them.' Long, hard hours are commonly required
when doctors work for MCOs and are "bad medicine" and "high-risk for
patients."'" Many doctors are complaining that an increase in the number
of hours they are expected to spend in scheduled appointments leaves
them less time for other necessary work.9

Another frustrating factor for doctors is the significant bargaining
imbalance between individual doctors in private practice and insurance
providers. 93 Private doctors rely on these companies to get paid and the
providers often take long periods of time to pay the claims that doctors
submit. 94 The providers also change the coding system that doctors
follow which shows the procedures the doctor used and the diagnosis. 9
The coding system assigns a number to each procedure and diagnosis
and requires doctors to list the specific codes pertaining to each patient."
The doctors write the codes on a claim sheet and submit claim sheets to
the health plan provider for payment. One claim sheet must be submitted
for each patient and if the patient is covered under more than one plan, a
claim sheet must be submitted to each provider. It is not hard to imagine
the chaos that a change in the coding system could cause for doctors. 97
This can result in extra hours of paperwork to resubmit claims for
payment. To date, this is one problem that doctors have been unable to

90. See Dan Lawlor, M.D., Commentary, Voice of the People, CHI.TRIB., Feb. 7, 1999, at 16,
available at 1999 WL 2858376.
91. Id.
92. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16. Doctors at clinics in Washington decided
to unionize after their HMO ordered them to increase their scheduled appointment time from thirtytwo hours per week to thirty-six hours per week. See id. The doctors say this leaves them very little
time to do paperwork and lab analysis. See id.
93. See Webber, supra note 68, at F8; see also Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16
(stating that doctors in private practice are unionizing to negotiate with HMOs); Lutsky, supra note
85, at 89 (discussing how doctors are ."feelingpowerless in a negotiating sense"').
94. See Now Hear This..., LEAGUE OF PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS (New York, N.Y.), Oct.
1999 (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal). There is a law requiring HMOs
to pay interest on claims that are not paid in a timely fashion. See id. However, doctors are claiming
that HMOs are able to get around paying interest on claims by intentionally sending a payment to
the doctor that is not in the correct amount, and then, after the doctor complains, sending the
payment again, without interest, because the "original remittance was timely." Id. This "self-serving
interpretation of 'timeliness' should not be tolerated" because it allows "the HMO [to] have its cake
and eat it too." Id.
95. See id. (discussing how Oxford Health Plans is now comparing its coding practices to the
Health Care Financing Administration's national benchmarks and threatening doctors with
"reduction[s] in fee schedules" and "refunds through arbitration proceedings").
96. See id.; EPSTEIN, supranote 15, at 19-20.
97. The coding system "specifties] which procedures the insurer will cover." EPSTEIN, supra
note 15, at 20. Through the coding system, MCOs "limit the payments for the number of days a
patient can be hospitalized, the number of tests, and the cost of procedures." Id.
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do much about."

Private doctors feel that joining a union could give them the power
to negotiate that they lack on their own. 99 Many private physicians would
argue that the situation is out of control and MCOs are at such an
advantage that they "can refuse contract changes proposed by doctors
and simply threaten to lock out any individual provider from a high
number of patients."" Unionizing might give doctors, in particular those
in private practice, a "chance for meaningful confrontation with a
backbone" when negotiating with MCOs.' ' Although doctors have
various reasons for joining unions, they can all agree that organizing
might be a good way "to get the message out that we [as a society] have
to improve health care."'' 0 2 Unfortunately, there are significant barriers
hindering private physicians from organizing and collectively

bargaining.
III. BARRIERS TO PRIVATE PHYSICIANS ORGANIZING AND
COLLECTIVELY BARGAINING
A. Policy Arguments Against Doctor Unionization
Today, a tension exists within the medical community. Everyone
seems to have an opinion as to whether or not doctor unionization is a
good idea. As expected, insurance companies and MCOs are against
unionization, but surprisingly enough so are some doctors.' 3 Regardless

98. Doctors are trying to come up with ways to fight back. One example of how they are
attempting to fight the HMOs that send incorrect remittances is by sending written complaints to
their representatives instead of protesting directly and demanding prompt repayment with interest
unless there is a valid rationale for the offset. See Now Hear This .... supra note 94.
99. See generally BargainingBill Urged to Protect Patients, AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC
SURGEONS BuLL., Aug. 1999, at 25 [hereinafter BargainingBill] (stating that HMOs offer doctors
only one choice, "'take my business, or go out of business'); see also Webber, supra note 68, at F8
(noting the AMA's decision to start a union sends a strong message about how frustrated doctors
are, and feel that they need to speak with more than "individual voices").
100. BargainingBill, supra note 99, at 25. An IMO can refuse to allow individual doctors or
clinics to be providers for people covered under that particular plan, thereby "locking them out."
This puts doctors in a compromising position as they are dealing with extremely large and powerful
HMOs that require their insured to only see certain providers. See id. Therefore, doctors that are
locked out would be unable to see what amounts, in certain circumstances, to a large number of
patients. See id.
101. Lawlor, supranote 90, at 16.
102. Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16.
103. See id.; Terry Kosdrosky, Doctors See Unions as Cure for System's Shortcomings,
CRAIN'S DETROrr Bus., Apr. 27, 1998, at 12, availableat 1998 WL 8235809; Lowes, supra note 6,
at 122.
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of who is arguing against unionization, some of the reasons have merit
and others seem absurd.

One reason against doctor unionization is that some doctors believe
it is unprofessional.'0 According to these doctors, unionizing affects a

doctor's image.' 5 For some doctors, the fear surrounding physician
unionization arises from the stigma attached to the word "union.""' Due
to the history of unions, many doctors perceive unions as traditionally
blue-collar, used by skilled laborers, not professionals. "7Therefore, they
believe that joining a union would give them an unprofessional
appearance."'
Advocates of doctors' unions view this as ludicrous. Dr. Robert

Weinmann, the President of the California-based Union of American
Physicians and Dentists, agrees: "'I know these are things doctors are
uncomfortable with. But they have to get over some of the smugness and
the view that they are more professional than everyone else."' '''
Resistance to doctors' unions puzzles other proponents of unionization.

Anthony Tonzola, interim president of the Physicians Union of New
Jersey says: "'Why shouldn't we be together with people who are
hammered by HMOs?""
Another reason some doctors are against unionization is because
they feel it conflicts with their Hippocratic Oath."' They see strikes as
the main and "ultimate" weapon of unions." ' If doctors were to go on
strike, it would be unethical;" 3 they would in essence be denying care to
104. See Lowes, supra note 6, at 122; see Greenhouse, Unions, supranote 6, at A16.
105. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16; Kosdrosky, supra note 103, at 12.
106. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16; Kosdrosky, supranote 103, at 12.
107. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16. Because the patient is relying on the
doctor for his or her special knowledge and expertise, doctors seem to feel that there is something
about the doctor/patient relationship that suggests it is special and, therefore, they should not belong
to unions. See Phan, supra note 61, at 117. To many doctors and critics of doctor unionization,
unionizing means the deterioration of this "special relationship." See id. at 117-18.
108. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, atA16.
109. Kosdrosky, supranote 103, at 12.
110. Lowes, supra note 6,at 118, 122; see also Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16.
111. See Lowes, supra note 6, at 122; Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16. The
Hippocratic Oath is an oath taken by physicians entering the practice of medicine. See SUGARWEBB, supra 29, at 6. At one time it was believed to have come from an ancient Greek physician
called Hippocrates, the "'father of medicine."' See id. at 5-6. The oath is comprised of things a
doctor promises to do or to refrain from doing. See The Hippocratic Oath, available at
http://www.medexplorer.com/hippocratic.dbm (last visited May 17,2001) (on file with the Hofstra
Labor & Employment Law Journal).
112. See Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 6, at A16.
113. "'[A]s a physician, I wouldn't think of joining a union ....With a union, the ultimate
weapon is striking and that's something as a physician, ethically, I'm never going to do." Id.
(quoting Sheryl Sun, an internist at the Kaiser Permanente Clinic in Santa Clara, California).
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patients in violation of the Hippocratic Oath." 4 Therefore, the possibility
of a strike has remained a reason why many doctors oppose

unionization.
This fear of doctors striking is reasonable. Strikes have happened in
the past and there are no guarantees that they will not happen in the
future. In 1975, a California physician walkout resulted in a staff
reduction of forty percent and losses estimated at 7.5 million dollars for
hospitals. ' 5 However, it is important to keep in mind that only two
strikes by nonresident physicians have occurred in the last sixteen

years." 6 The AMA has also addressed this concern by announcing it will

not permit its union members to use the striking tool." 7 While there are
some doctors who are worried that the AMA has given away "'one of
the bargaining chips""' 8 by not considering striking, there are others who
still remain reluctant to join a union for the very idea that a strike could
occur." 9 This fear, coupled with concern over a professional image, is
enough to keep many private doctors from joining a union.

Additionally, some physicians believe doctors should not unionize
because there are other alternatives available. They argue that there are
already groups in place to address the needs of doctors, and therefore
doctors' unions are unnecessary.'20 These groups include medical
societies, which already handle their problems and work to address their
needs.'' In Michigan, doctors have one such group, the Michigan State

114. See Phan, supra note 61, at 138. In part, the Hippocratic Oath states:
I will use my power to help the sick to the best of my ability and judgment; I will abstain
from harming or wrongdoing any man by it....
If, therefore, I observe this Oath and do
not violate it, may I prosper both in my life and in my profession, earning good repute
among all men for all time. If I transgress and forswear this Oath, may my lot be
otherwise.
The HippocraticOath, available at http://www.medexplorer.com.hippocratic.dbm (last visited May
17, 2001) (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal). Both doctors and society
take the Hippocratic Oath very seriously. However, it is the sentiment of many doctors that because
unions and HMOs did not take the Oath, "[tihey could care less about the patient's suffering." Phan,
supra note 61, at 138. While the doctors who feel this way recognize that there are alternatives to
striking, they also feel that it is always the last resort of unions and this is unacceptable to them. See
id. Striking, to many individuals, makes unions no,better to deal with than HMOs. See id. This
sentiment is changing rapidly, however, as physicians are beginning to feel that there is no
alternative than to turn to collective bargaining to better deal with HMOs. See id. at 138.
115. See Phan, supra note 61, at 118.
116. Seeid.
117. See Lowes, supranote 6, at 122.
118. Webber, supra note 68, at F8.
119. See Greenhouse, Unions, supranote 6, at A16.
120. See Kosdrosky, supranote 103, at 12.
121. See id.
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Medical Society, advocating on their behalf. 2 Recently, it successfully
argued a case against an insurance company.' 3 Moreover, those who
support these societies feel that they are better suited for doctors because
patient care is one of their priorities. 4 Further, these societies are not
faced with the legal hurdles plaguing doctor unionization.'21
Advocates for doctor unionization argue that medical societies do
not do enough for doctors and that something more is necessary,
especially with the increased number of HMOs." 6 Proponents of doctors'
unions maintain that "[h]ealth-care unions have led the fight to protect
public health care, and they work to support patient advocacy."'2 7 Their
argument is that:
Unions tend to be proactive, taking chances in new areas of employee
rights and advocating strongly on behalf of individual members: in
contrast, [medical] associations are more reactive. [They] often wait
until major issues affect a majority of their membership, then attempt
to address those issues on a general, rather than [an] individulized
basis.'2'
This is interesting because it is unclear whether medical associations,
such as the AMA, are precluded by antitrust law to act as labor
organizations and collectively bargain. Therefore, it is hard to
understand why it has taken the AMA so long to get involved and why
many of these societies are still maintaining their traditional roles. 9
Apart from doctors, HMOs and hospitals also have concerns over
unionization. HMOs argue that unionization will result in higher costs
for patient care.' They claim that they "have controlled skyrocketing

122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Kosdrosky, supra note 103, at 12.
126. See Lutsky, supra note 85, at 93. Advocates of doctors' unions stress the fact that
associations deal with the issues doctors face by giving them general solutions instead of analyzing
the particular problem or situation at hand. See id. One doctor wrote to two different medical
associations and they did not attempt to deal With his particular situation, but instead gave general
advice while telling him to "'consult [his] own attorney."' Id. When dealing with the same situation,
a union immediately sent a representative to plan a course of action. See id.
127. Lawlor, supranote 90, at 16.
128. Lutsky, supra note 85, at 93.
129. See id. One explanation of the AMA's hesitancy is that "'[it], unfortunately, has always
been a responding type of organization, waiting for the course of history and course of sociology to
bypass it, and then responding with sort of studied moderation to things that already happened."' Id.
130. See David Schwab, MDs DeniedRight To Unionize Against HMOs, STAR-LEDGER, May
25, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 2982012; Burney, supra note 63.
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health costs."' 3 ' Therefore, if doctors unionize, HMOs maintain that they
will not be able to keep a close eye on doctors, resulting in increased
fees and the performance of unnecessary tests. 32 AmeriHealth's
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, G. Fred DiBona, Jr., said:
"'consumers [will] face[] considerably higher costs in the future",133 if
doctors unionize. Some hospitals are also against unionization for the
same reason. The concern is that unionization will result in increased
patient costs and lost profits'3 From a business perspective, inefficiency
is created because hospitals will be providing the same quality of care as
before, but at a higher cost.' However, while the current care provided
and hospitals are
to patients might be cost-efficient, both HMOs
36
itself.'
care
the
in
quality
of
lack
overlooking the
Public sentiment also plays a role in the doctor unionization
movement. While unions are becoming more enticing to private
physicians, with many being persuaded to join their ranks, others still
feel that they cannot take the plunge and join a union because the public
sentiment seems so strongly against it. 3 7 The opposition from outside of
the medical community stems from the view that doctors are highly
compensated and "do not have the right to complain about their
incomes.' ' 13 Additionally, doctors are seen as protectors and guardians,

distinguishing them from other employees. 39
Aside from the reasons mentioned above, critics contend that
unionization will not solve the inherent conflict in the relationship

131. Burney, supra note 63.
132. See id.
133. Schwab, supra note 130. AmeriHealth was rated one of New Jersey's top HMOs by the
New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services. See id. G. Fred DiBona, Jr.'s statement was
in response to the NLRB's ruling that doctors were independent contractors and not employees. See
id. These New Jersey doctors had joined United Food and Commercial Workers Local 56. See
Burney, supra note 63. As a result of the NLRB's ruling, these doctors are not permitted to
collectively bargain with HMOs. See id.
134. See Greenhouse, Unions,supranote 6, at A16; Schwab, supra note 130.
135. See Kosdrosky, supra note 103, at 12.
136. See Schwab, supra note 130 (reporting that doctors are complaining that HMOs interfere
with medical decisions by "refusing to pay for expensive procedures" and "forcing patients to leave
the hospital early").
137. See Lutsky, supra note 85, at 90-91.
138. Id.at9l.
139. See id. "[T]he medical profession stands alone in the widespread perception that it should
not be able to rise up and protect its interests." Id. Movie stars and athletes, who are also highly
compensated, have the right to unionize and the public does not protest in the same way that it does
when doctors' unionizing efforts are involved. See id. This shows that it is not the high
compensation, but rather society's perception of the role of doctors in the community, that leads to
public opposition to physician unionization.
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between doctors and health plan providers. 4 ' If doctors unionize, the
unionization will create a "physician monopoly.'' When this happens,
insurance companies and HMOs will not just sit back and watch; they
will fight back. 42 For them to equalize the playing field, the insurance
companies and the HMOs will also "band together."' 43 The fear is that 44
a
domino effect will result and both sides will end up where they started.'
B. Antitrust Law
In addition to the policy considerations, legal obstacles exist which
prevent doctor unionization. The first of these obstacles involves
antitrust regulations. There are two laws governing antitrust, the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. 4 Congress passed the Sherman Act
to prevent monopolies in trade and commerce.146 As a result of the
Sherman Act, labor organizations encountered problems bargaining for
wages and working conditions with employers.'47 This happened when
federal courts held that unions bargaining for wages interrupted the flow
of commerce by attempting to create monopolies. 48 Consequently,
injunctions 9 were issued against labor organizations for antitrust
4
violations.
Congress passed the Clayton Act in response to problems
experienced by labor organizations under the Sherman Act.' The
Clayton Act exempts labor organizations from antitrust violations by
prohibiting courts from issuing injunctions for bargaining about terms

140. See Burney, supranote 63.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See Sherman.Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 52-53 (1994).
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 states that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.; see also Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 801 (1945) (discussing
the history of the Sherman Act).
147. See Allen Bradley Co., 325 U.S. at 801.
148. See id. at 802.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 803-04.
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and conditions of employment.15 ' Section 17 of the Clayton Act provides
that labor "is not a commodity or article of commerce."' 52 It also makes
it lawful for members of labor organizations to engage in collective
activities.' 53 In Allen Bradley, the Supreme Court, taking both the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act into consideration, concluded that
bargaining between labor organizations and business employers does not
violate antitrust law unless the two sides intend to use the bargaining
process to drive out competition. 54 If, as a natural and probable result of
the bargaining, competitors are eliminated, there is no antitrust violation
151. See 29 U.S.C. § 52. Section 52 provides that:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States, or a
judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, or between
employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and
persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms
or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property,
or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no
adequate remedy at law, and such property or property right must be described with
particularity in the application, which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or
by his agent or attorney.
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether
singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to
perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by
peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such person or
persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating
information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from
working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from
recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or
from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any
strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a
lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might
lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the
acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the
United States.
Id. Courts can, however, issue injunctions where certain property interests are at stake or where
labor practices violate the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1994).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 17. Section 17 provides that:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of
labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual
help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws.
Id.
153. See id.
154. See Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 809-11. It is noteworthy that the Court found an antitrust
violation because the purpose of the bargaining in that case was to eliminate competition. See id.;
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965).
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because the collective bargaining was not aimed at causing this result.'
C. The NationalLabor RelationsAct
A third barrier facing unionizing doctors is federal labor law. The
applicable federal law in this area is the NLRA.'5 6 The purpose of the
NLRA is to protect the rights of employees to organize or join a labor
organization and to collectively bargain with employers for competitive
wage earnings and good working conditions.'57 By protecting this right,
the bargaining power between employers and employees becomes equal,
limiting unrest within that labor sector.'58 However, federal law creates a
problem for unionizing doctors because the NLRA does not necessarily
protect their right to organize and collectively bargain."9 Doctors may
run into problems regarding coverage under the NLRA in certain
circumstances such as: employee status, unit determination, and multiple
role situations.'9
The NLRA only protects the rights of employees as defined under
the Act. It does not give supervisors or independent contractors the
right to join labor organizations.' 6 As discussed below, the reason for
their exclusion is that they simply do not need the NLRA's protection.
Independent contractors work and get paid on a job by job basis as
opposed to employees who work for a set hourly wage or annual
salary.' 63 They negotiate the price for each undertaking and, if
dissatisfied, can refuse the work.' 64 Their income does not depend on
wages, "but upon the difference between what they pay for goods,
materials, and labor and what they receive for the end result, that is,
upon profits."' 65 To determine whether a person is an independent
contractor, the NLRB applies the "'right-of-control"' test. 6 A person is
an independent contractor if the hiring party only has control over the
155. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665-66. The Court held that an attempt by the union and
employers "to secure uniform labor standards throughout the industry, ifproved, was not exempt
from the anti-trust laws." Id. at 669.
156. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68.
157. See id. at § 151.
158. See id.
159. See Lutsky, supra note 85, at 63-64.
160. See id. at 64.
161. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
162. See id.
163. See ST. ANTOINE E AL., supra note 26, at 52.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 53.
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end result 67 If the Board finds that the worker in question does not have
any control "over the manner and means by which the result is
accomplished[,]" that worker is an employee.6'
Supervisors, like independent contractors, are not covered under the
NLRA. It provides that:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is •not of •a merely routine
or clerical nature,
170
but requires the use of independent judgment.
Normally if people engage in any of these activities, they will be labeled
a supervisor and precluded from the protection of the Act.17 1 "Where a
physician fits into the definitions, and whether she has certain indicia is
often a difficult issue and requires careful analysis.' '72 Therefore, when
determining whether a physician is a supervisor, the Board has to
evaluate each case individually.'73
Generally, the Board has found private practice doctors to be
supervisors or independent contractors so they have not been afforded
protection under the NLRA 7 4 In some instances, doctors have been
categorized as professional employees and their175right to organize and
collectively bargain was protected under the Act.

167. See id.
168. ST. ANTOINE ET AL., supranote 26, at 53.
169. Under the original Act supervisors were treated as employees and were afforded
protection. See id. at 54. This changed, however, when employers attacked the original Act. See id.
with the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Congress amended the NLRA by "expressly exclud[ing] from
the definition of 'employee' 'any individual employed as a supervisor' and adopted an apparently
broad definition of 'supervisors."' Id. (citation omitted).

170. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
171. See id. at § 152(3), (11); see also Leigh Anne Flavin, Comment, The Thomas-Davis
Cases: The Appropriateness of Physiciansas Bargaining Units and the Possible Implicationsfor
hisuranceCompanies Under the National LaborRelationsAct, 30 ARiz. ST. L.J. 811, 813 (1998).
172. Flavin, supranote 171, at 813-14.
173. See id.at819.
174. See id. at 818-21 (discussing different Board findings as to whether a doctor was an
employee or a supervisor). See, e.g., AmeriHealth Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Oct. 18, 1999), 1999
WL 963200, at *32 (finding that private practice physicians were independent contractors and not
employees).
175. See Montefiore, 261 N.L.R.B. at 569. Montefiore Hospital and Medical Center is a notfor-profit organization that provides health care services. See id. The managerial decisions of the
hospital were acted out by the hospital's extensive administrative structure. See id. at 570-71. The
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1. Can Doctors Be Both Employers and Employees at the Same Time?
In order for private practice doctors to be granted protection by the
NLRA, an exception must be created. This is not as simple as it sounds.
The exception must provide that these doctors are employees for

collective bargaining purposes, but retain employer status in all other
work-related circumstances. This conflict may present problems when
the physicians negotiate with the managed care organizations.176
The following hypothetical is used to illustrate how one doctor
could be classified as both an employer and an employee. Assume that
an independent private practitioner owns and runs a private medical
practice. Twenty doctors work for this practice, therefore, they are
employees of the practice. Because the independent private practitioner
177
runs the practice, he or she is the employer of those twenty employees.
This practice has contracted with MCOs. These contracts allow it to
provide services to patients insured by those MCOs. The private doctors
staff doctors' involvement in managerial decisions was restricted to recommendations subject to
evaluation by the administration. See id. at 571. The main duty of the staff doctors was and still is
patient care. See id. Therefore, the NLRB determined the hospital's staff doctors were not
supervisors, but professional employees whose rights are protected by the NLRA. See id. at 569.
176. Cf. Memorandum from (name omitted), Attorney at National Labor Relations Board
Region 29, to AI Blyer, Attorney at National Labor Relations Board Region 29 (Nov. 20, 1997)
[hereinafter Memorandum to Al Blyer] (on file with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal)
(discussing how a problem exists where custodian engineers are not only employees of the Board of
Education but also are employers of other custodians).
An inquiry into the custodian case problem is useful because it deals with similar issues
that are likely to arise with respect to private doctors if they are allowed to unionize. First, it is
important to understand what the facts are in typical custodian cases because it helps draw out the
analogy to doctors. The case that illustrates this analogy is In re Sch. & LibraryEmployees Union,
Local 74, N.Y. Pub. Empl. Relations Bd. (March 8, 1976) (No. D-0087). In this case, there was a
custodian engineer who worked for a particular school but was employed by the Board of
Education. See Memorandum to Al Blyer (providing a helpful recitation of the facts). His duties
were to oversee the other custodians and make sure that they were performing their duties. See Sch.
& Library Employees Union (No. D-0087). The custodian engineer has complete control over the
hiring and firing of the other custodians. See id. In fact, he issues the paychecks of the other
custodians and cleaners. See Stip.
6, Sch. & Library Employees Union (No. D-0087). The
custodian engineer was covered as an employee under a collective bargaining agreement between
the Board of Education and his union. See Memorandum to Al Blyer. Yet, that same custodian
engineer was represented by the same union in his role as the employer of the other custodians and
cleaners. See id. In other words, Local 891 acts as a union by representing the custodian engineers
in their collective bargaining with the Board of Education, but also as a multi-employer association
by representing those same engineers as employers of cleaners. See id. Therefore, the custodian
engineer and the union are playing multiple roles.
177. Think of the owner as the head partner of a law firm. The head partner at a law firm is still
an attorney, but he or she makes more money than others at the firm and is in charge of most major
decisions. The head partner also "runs" the firm. The owner/doctor in our hypothetical "runs" the
practice and the other doctors are his or her employees.
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would want to organize to form a union to collectively bargain with
these MCOs for better working conditions. Here is where the confusion
surfaces. In our hypothetical, the doctors at the clinic, if unionized,
would collectively bargain with the MCOs. However, the owner-doctor
is the employer of the other twenty doctors. There are going to be issues
the doctor will bargain for, as the business owner of the practice, that
will conflict with the issues the other twenty doctors are concerned with,
such as considerations for better patient care.
Society is already concerned that doctors want to unionize to raise
their profits. The argument is that if in a position to negotiate, doctors
will use that ability solely to increase profits. The problem illustrated by
the hypothetical, doctors simultaneously acting as employers and
employees, exemplifies this societal concern. Because the owner of a
clinic/private practice is in a position to negotiate with the MCOs, he or
she is also in a position to make deals with the MCOs that may
compromise the best interest of the patients. These deals might adversely
affect the interests of the other doctors in the practice as well."s
Aside from the aforementioned policy concern, legally, there is a
problem with unit determination.' 79 As discussed earlier, the Board
determines the proper bargaining unit.8 ° Although the previous
discussion is in the context of private physicians not fitting into the same
bargaining unit as housestaff (interns, residents, and fellows), the same
problem arises here. It is not clear that owner-doctors should be placed
in the same unit as the doctors they employ because of the possibility of
diverging interests. Once the Board establishes a bargaining unit, no
collective bargaining can take place outside of that unit.' ' If the Board
determines that all private physicians are part of the same bargaining
unit, it is likely that the owner-doctor's interests will supercede those of
his or her employees. Then arises the concern that patient care might be
sacrificed as well.

178. In the hypothetical case, the owner-doctor is going to be concerned with not only patient
care, but also running a business and maximizing profits. There is a possibility that the business
interests of the owner-doctor make his interests so different from those of the other doctors that
together they do not make an appropriate bargaining unit.
179. Interview with Richard Bock, Attorney for the National Labor Relations Board, Region
29, in Hempstead, N.Y. (Feb. 15,2000).
180. See supranotes 28-30 and accompanying text.
181. See ST. ANTOINE Er AL., supra note 26, at 265 (discussing how employers can bargain
only exclusively with the representative unit).
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2. Multiple Employer Problems
a. Single Employer Units
If private physicians are given the right to collectively bargain with
MCOs, then there are some issues that arise regarding the parties
involved in the negotiations. Going back to our hypothetical, three
parties are involved: 1) the owner-doctor; 2) the physician employees;
and 3) the MCOs. The physician employees, arguably, have two
employers. This leads to some of the same issues raised when
determining proper bargaining units."x In some situations, it might be
appropriate to consider multiple employers as a single employer unit for
collective bargaining purposes. In our example, the single employer unit
would be the MCO and owner-doctor.
The question becomes whether the MCO and owner-doctor are two
separate entities sufficiently integrated as to constitute a single
employer. To determine this, the Board must evaluate: "(1) functional
integration of operations; (2) centralized control of labor relations; (3)
common management; and (4) common ownership. ' 83
When looking at these factors, it is unlikely that owner-doctors and
MCOs would ever be considered a single-employer unit by the NLRB. It
is clear that MCOs and owner-doctors do not have any type of functional
integration -of operations. They only interact with one another for
approval of patient care and payment for services. While the doctors
may feel that the MCOs have "management control," the inner workings
of the doctors' offices are only controlled by the owner-doctors and their
staff. If the owner-doctor no longer wants to deal with a particular MCO,
the owner-doctor can decide to forgo future contract deals with that
MCO after their present contract expires.
In Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v.
Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc.,' 4 the NLRB found that WSIM, the
local radio station and the Holt Broadcasting Service were a singleemployer unit because WSIM was owned and operated by Holt.'
Therefore, looking at the structure of the two corporations, WSIM was
essentially a subsidiary due to its substantial integration with Holt

182. See infra Part III.C.1 & 2.b.
183. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Radio
Union v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965).
184. 380 U.S. 255 (1965).

185. See id. at 256.
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Broadcasting. 8 6 As can be seen, a private doctor's office has a
completely different relationship with an MCO.
b. Joint and Multi-Employer Bargaining Units
Another difficulty arises for society when private practice
physicians have to contract with several different MCOs. The doctors'
unions will have to negotiate and bargain with each MCO individually,
which is both onerous and inefficient. As a result, doctors' unions will
have to abide by many different collective bargaining agreements.
Normally, when this problem arises in other contexts, the solution for
the negotiating parties is to consent to multi-employer bargaining.'"
To illustrate the concept of multi-employer bargaining, consider
this example. There are three MCOs: MCO-1, MCO-2, and MCO-3.
Each contracts with the union representing the private physicians. If they
were to bargain as a multi-employer unit, the union and the MCOs
would negotiate and bargain together to reach a collective agreement
binding all parties. 88 After consent to this arrangement has been given
and negotiations have begun, no party may withdraw from the
negotiations until an agreement is reached.'89 If the parties have
bargained to the point of impasse, each side has tools it can use to
facilitate further negotiations.9 0 The union may, for example, engage in a
whipsaw strike.'91 In a whipsaw strike the union will choose one of the
employers in the multi-employer unit and have its employees strike. 9 2 If
the impasse remains beyond this first strike, the union will continue
down the line striking each employer in succession. 93 To combat
the
94
striking efforts of the union, the employers may institute a lockout.
However, multi-employer bargaining units are not attractive to
society. The tools used to break an impasse will likely result in an MCO
monopoly over the entire health plan industry. As noted earlier,
physicians striking is unacceptable to both doctors and society due to

186. See id.
187. See Douglas L. Leslie, Symposium on the Law and Economics of Bargaining:
MultiemployerBargainingRules, 75 VA. L. REV. 241,241-42 (1989).
188. Seeid. at241.
189. See id. at 242.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 242-43; see also ST. ANTOINE ET AL., supranote 26, at 282.
192. See ST. ANTOINE ET AL., supra note 26, at 282-84 (discussing Charles D. Bonanno Linen
Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982)).
193. See id.
194. See id. at 282; Leslie, supra note 187, at 243.
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their commitment to watch over patients. Without the striking tool,
however, doctors would be at the mercy of the MCO multi-employer
unit. MCOs, on the other hand, are in the business of making money.
They do not take an oath to provide health care to the sick, therefore,
they would have no objection to utilizing the lockout tool. By locking
out doctors, MCOs would essentially be locking out patients, denying
them patient care in much the same way a doctors' strike would. From a
business perspective, joining a multi-employer bargaining unit is great
for the MCOs because they can all band together and fix health care
prices. This leaves the customer-patients without the ability to shop
around for the best health care coverage at reasonable prices.
Consequently, society should be wary of these MCO multi-employer
bargaining units as a response to doctor unionization.
IV. THE ELIMINATION OF OBSTACLES THROUGH
LEGISLATION
A. House of RepresentativesBill 13049'
In this country, the ongoing debate over health care has people
urging Congress to get involved. 96 Congress has been unable to get
much accomplished because of the disagreement over the proper
solution. The result has been a series of proposed bills submitted by
different members of the House of Representatives.197 None of these
bills, however, have proven sufficient in accomplishing anything
significant, other than more debate amongst our representatives.
The most recent bill, however, proposes a change in the law dealing
specifically with the organization of physicians for the purposes of
collectively bargaining with HMOs and other insurance companies. '
The proposed bill's stated purpose is
[t]o ensure and foster continued patient safety and quality of care by
making the antitrust laws apply to negotiations between groups of
health care professionals and health plans and health insurance issuers
in the same manner as such laws apply to collective bargaining by

195. H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (1999).
196. See generally BargainingBill, supra note 99, at 25 (stressing doctors' concerns over the
current health care situation).
197. See H.R. 1304; H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2824, 106th Cong. (1999).
198. See H.R. 1304; see also BargainingBill, supra note 99, at 25.
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labor organizations under the National Labor Relations Act'
Essentially, the proposed bill attempts to provide for an antitrust
exemption for all health care professionals in the limited context of
bargaining and negotiating with health plan providers .2 House Bill
1304, also known as the Campbell Bill,"' states that in these
negotiations, the physicians, even private doctors, should be treated the
same way as employees who are covered under the NLRA.2 This is an
attempt to bypass the finding that physicians in private practice are
independent contractors, managers, or employers, not employees
covered by the NLRA2 Proponents of the bill argue that this would
help level out the playing field between physicians and health plans.l 4
Furthermore, H.R. 1304 eliminates concern over physician strikes
through an express limitation prohibiting such strikes.2 5 This limitation
states that "[t]he exemption provided in subsection (a) shall not confer
any right to participate in any collective cessation of service to patients
not otherwise permitted by law."*" Although this anti-strike provision
makes the bill look attractive, due to strong lobbying by MCOs,
Republican leaders in the House of Representatives have put the bill
aside.f 7
B. PreventingStrikes Through State Law
Striking continues to be a major source of discomfort for those
promoting doctor unionization.0 3 Although H.R. 1304 attempts to solve
this problem, there are state laws that offer valuable solutions. For
example, many states prohibit public employees from striking.2 0 The
purpose of these anti-strike laws is to provide a way for public
employees to organize and collectively bargain over working conditions
while protecting the community's health and safety by disallowing

199. H.R. 1304.
200.

See id.; see also BargainingBill, supra note 99, at 25.

201. The Bill is referred to as the Campbell Bill because it was introduced by Representative
Tom Campbell, a Republican from California. See H.R. 1304.
202. See id.
203. See id. (stating that physicians "shall not be regarded as having the status of an employer,
independent contractor, managerial employee, or supervisor").
204. See BargainingBill, supranote 99, at 25.
205. See H.R. 1304 § 3(c).
206. Id.
207. See 160 CONG. Rac. S13599 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1999) (statement of Sen. Graham).
208. See Greenhouse, Unions, supranote 6, at A16.
209. See, e.g., N.Y. Cry. SERv.LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1999).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

27

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 11
HofstraLabor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 18:659

cessation of service.1 Public employees that have been prevented from
striking include police officers, firefighters, and teachers. 2" Employees

of state or municipally owned utilities such as: electrical workers, water
and sewage workers, transit system workers, and port facility workers
have also been prevented from striking. While the majority of these

employees are blue-collar workers, their jobs involve caring for the
public. Police officers and firefighters, in particular, care for the public
in a way that makes striking seem reprehensible. Doctors striking would
have the same effect, if not worse, than a strike by public employees.

Anti-striking laws have not prevented these public employees from
effectively organizing and negotiating over working conditions.2 3 These
same laws also provide alternate methods for resolving negotiation
211
disputes. The public employees' union is required to negotiate with the

employer until impasse.2 5 Upon reaching the point of impasse, the union
and employer have several options. First, the employer and the union
can choose a neutral arbitrator to come and mediate the situation to reach

a comparable resolution of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.216 Second, the employer and the union can turn to the Public

Employment Relations Board ("PERB"),

27

which can appoint a

2

mediator to resolve the dispute. Lastly, if an impasse still exists, the
Board will make a recommendation to resolve it by deciding the terms

210. See Bernard T. King, The TaylorAct-Experiment in Public Employer-Employee Relations,
20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 3 (1968).
211. See, e.g., Warwick Sch. Comm. v. Warwick Teacher's Union Local 915, 613 A.2d 1273,
1275-76 (R.I. 1992) (teachers); City of New Orleans v. Police Ass'n of La., Teamsters Local No.
253, 369 So. 2d 188, 190 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (police officers); Syracuse Hancock Prof'l
Firefighters Ass'n, Local 1888, 494 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193 (App. Div. 1985) (firefighters).
212. See City of Pana v. Crowe, 316 N.E.2d 513, 515-16 (Ill. 1974) (water and sewage
workers); Hanson v. Commonwealth, 181 N.E.2d 843, 847-48 (Mass. 1962) (transit system
workers); City of Alcoa v. IBEW Local Union 760, 308 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Tenn. 1957) (electrical
workers); City of Wilmington v. Gen. Teamsters Local Union 326, 290 A.2d 8, 13 (Del. Ch. 1972)
(port facility workers).
213. See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209. See, e.g., Matthew Carolan & Raymond J. Keating,
Don't Blame Island's Copsfor Their Lofty Salaries,NEwSDAY (New York, N.Y.), Sept. 5, 2000, at
A26 (confirming that the Nassau County police officers' union has successfully negotiated high
salaries, $90,000 on average, without the use of a strike).
214. See N.Y. CtV. SERV. LAW §§ 205,209.
215. See Inc. Vill. of Lynbrook v. N.Y. State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 48 N.Y.2d 398,
402 n.1 (1979).
216. See N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209(2); Niagara Wheatfield Adm'rs Ass'n v. Niagara
Wheatfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 44 N.Y.2d 68, 71 (1978); County of Broome v. Deputy Sheriffs
Benevolent Ass'n, 395 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (App. Div. 1977).
217. See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 205(1).
218. See id. at § 209(3)(a).
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and conditions of employment."9
Doctors' unions should be held to the same anti-striking laws as
public employees. Prohibiting the use of strikes allows doctors to
collectively bargain and organize without having to worry about
harming the community's health and safety.
V. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that there are many problems that must be resolved
before private physicians can organize and collectively bargain with
MCOs in an effective manner. Even if legislation resolves the legal
problems, such as antitrust regulations and the applicability of the
NLRA, other issues, the biggest being the striking tool, arise that must
be addressed. One question that must be answered is: will doctor
unionization be effective if doctors waive the right to strike, the most
powerful and threatening of all union tools? The answer is unclear, but
one thing we do know-doctors' strikes are unacceptable as a matter of
public policy.
Although recent proposed legislation seems attractive, there are
valid concerns that it would lead to a shift of power resulting in
physicians raising their fees.20 These costs would then be passed along
to the patient through the insurance companies and MCOs.' This is
problematic because if doctors conduct and charge MCOs for
unnecessary tests or charge more for services, all of the costs will be
passed on to the patients. So, what can be done?
While attempts at unionization and negotiation with MCOs are
forthcoming and some doctors' unions have been established, perhaps
the answer lies in MCO contract negotiations. Doctors should focus on
strengthening their medical societies by having them work with MCOs
to establish a contract negotiating clause that would allow both doctors
and MCOs to continuously argue for terms that are important to them.
These contracts should also include provisions that guide the parties if
negotiations fail. Since MCOs are heavily opposed to doctor
unionization, this alternative might be the answer. They should focus on
the fact that this option, while not as favorable for them as the current
system, is clearly better than dealing with doctors' unions.
The contracts should be structured to utilize alternative dispute
219. See id. § 209(3); County of Niagara v. Newman, 481 N.Y.S.2d 563, 564 (App. Div.
1984).
220. See BargainingBill, supranote 99, at 25.
221. See id.
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resolution ("ADR"). ADR includes arbitration and mediation and
consists of bringing in a third party to arbitrate or mediate disputes that
arise between the parties. This would allow conflicts arising between
health care providers and MCOs to be handled out-of-court. The parties
would agree to submit disputes to mutually chosen mediators and
arbitrators for resolution, emphasizing patient care as the main concern
and profits as secondary. For this very reason, the public will have more
faith in the resolutions. It is good for the parties because it is more costeffective than going to court and does not take as long to resolve. It also
eliminates the need for tools like striking and lockouts, and facilitates
negotiations and communication between doctors and MCOs.
A variation of this ADR model would involve doctors' unions and
MCOs submitting disputes under collective bargaining agreements to
mediation or arbitration. In this context, if an impasse is reached, MCOs
and doctors' unions will turn to a neutral mediator or arbitrator for a
binding resolution. A clause in the collective bargaining agreement
between the MCO and the union will provide guidance in these
situations. Currently, many public employees such as firefighters, police
officers, and teachers are prohibited from striking, yet have successfully
negotiated with their employers. However, if negotiations fail, the
parties turn to the arbitration/mediation process outlined by state law.
State legislatures should implement analogous legislation for private
physicians.
It is apparent that if MCOs continue to grow more powerful, private
physicians must be given sufficient power to negotiate with them.
Implementing a solution, such as the options discussed above, will
establish better relationships between MCOs, private physicians, and,
most importantly, patients.
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